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ARTICLE
THE IDEALIST DISCOURSE OF LEGAL
PROFESSIONALISM IN MARYLAND:
DELINEATING THE OMISSIONS AND ELOQUENT
SILENCES AS A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
By: Kez U. Gabriel, J.D., Ph.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION: LIKE ROSE-COLORED GLASSES

years ago, I co-wrote a book on the sociology of education!
Several
with Reverend Dr. Michael S. Onwueme. Included in the book was a
2

chapter titled "Teaching as a Profession." We intended for the book to be
used by undergraduate students in their study of education and social
sciences. Many of my academic peers who previously handled such a
topic tended to grapple with it by asking and trying to answer one major
question: Is teaching a profession? After first indulging the standard trait
approach3 to the question, I reasoned that it probably mattered little how
one came out in answering this basic descriptive or "What" question in
any event. Thus, I decided to do something slightly different by posing

* Kez. U. Gabriel, J.D., Ph.D. was fonnerlya Social-Behavioral Science Professor at the
Anambra State College of Education and University of Technology in Nigeria, University of
Alberta, Canada, American University, and the University of Alaska. He was also fonnerly
Staff Attorney and Legal Services Director for the District of Columbia and Maryland based
African Legal, Human, and Civil Rights Center, Inc. Mr. Gabriel is currently Strategic
Litigation Counsel at the Arlington, Virginia Law Office of Oti W. Nwosu, LLC and in
affiliation with the Greenbelt, Maryland Dobe Law Group, LLC. He is a graduate of
American University, Washington College of Law, J.D., and received his doctorial degree at
University of Alberta, Ph.D. The author thanks University of Baltimore Law Forum Articles
Editor, Matthew Powell, and his editorial team for their technical assistance with this article.
I
MICHAEL S. ONWUEME & KEz GABRIEL-UGBOR, EDUCATION AND SOCIETY: THE
SOCIOWGY OF EDUCATION (Nigerian Educational Research Association 1994).
2
Reverend Dr. Michael S. Onwueme is a professor emeritus of education and religious
studies at the University of Benin in Nigeria.
3
The standard strategy was to outline upwards of ten characteristics of a profession,
including: (1) skill based on theoretical knowledge; (2) long period of education and training;
(3) entry regulation or license; (4) life-long commitment or career; (5) occupational
association; (6) code of ethics; (7) independence or autonomy; (8) altruism or public service
ideal; (9) occupational journal or magazine; and sense of community. Jd. at 116, 122. Then,
methodically and systematically process teaching, teacher preparation, and teachers through
each itemized trait or characteristic, and using the resulting grade balance sheet to finally
make an overall determination as to the adjudged status of teaching as a profession.
Employing basically the same "trait methodology," some of the appraisers and assessors of
the professional claims of teachers and teaching ended up answering yes, others ended up
answering no, while a third group would conclude that it depended on how one looked at it or
what set or combination of the characteristics of a profession one chose to emphasize. Id. at
122.
120
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higher-order "Why" and "Whose Interests" analytic questions to reach
my conclusions.4 I also proceeded to restate the chapter as "Teaching and
the Question of Professionalization." With the purposes of the exercise
fundamentally recast, the material immediately became more analytic,
enterprising, and even provocative. 5
In this article, I attempt to bring the same ethic of progressive and
transformative critique to bear on the "Ideals of Professionalism," the
recently released document by the Commission on Professionalism
(hereinafter the "Commission") of the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 6 I
specifically do so by delineating and analyzing some of the important
omissions and eloquent silences in the thoughtful and well-intentioned
document. This document represents a culmination of efforts that began
in 2003 to strengthen and promote the standing of the legal profession
under the direction of a Judicial Task Force on Professionalism. 7 Eight
subcommittees of the Commission studied and reported upon several
areas of concern identified by the Judicial Task Force on
Professionalism. 8 The task force's goal was to identify concerns that
appeared to threaten the historic glory and high professional ideals of the
Maryland legal community, while also protecting and promoting the
professional ideals. 9
The Commission studied several facets of lawyers' professional
conduct and formulated methods and recommendations intended to raise
professionalism standards in the Maryland legal community.
The
Commission developed a value system of professional conduct, featuring
a set of standards that lawyers should aspire to, together with associated
characteristics of accountability and trustworthiness; education,

4
For example: Why would teaching and teachers want to join the ranks of a profession
and professionals? Why would they not want to professionalize? Whose interests would
society serve best by transforming the lower middle class occupation of elementary and
secondary school teaching into a rock-solid middle class profession of powerful, prestigious,
and privileged instructional experts?
5
I actually found it a little easier to cut to the chase after prefacing the undertaking with
the standard trait approach by going to the unstated heart of the professionalism matter,
namely, the pursuit of social, cultural, and expert (i.e., skill and knowledge based) power,
authority, wealth, privilege, and prestige. See generally P.J. CORFIELD, POWER AND THE
PROFESSIONS IN BRITAIN, 1700-1850 (Routledge 1999); ELIOT FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONAL
POWERS: A STUDY OF THE INSTiTUTIONALIZATiON OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE (Univ. of Chicago
Press 1986); and TERENCE J. JOHNSON, PROFESSIONS AND POWER (Macmillan 1972). Most of
my academic peers who reviewed the material afterwards considered it refreshing, interesting,
transforming, and even progressive.
6
MD. CODE ANN., CTS., JUDGES & ATTORNEYS § 16-800 app. (Ideals of Professionalism)
(LexisNexis 2011), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/professionalism/pdfs/ideals.pdf
(hereinafter "Ideals of Professionalism").

7
8

9

Id.
Id.
Id.
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mentoring, and excellence; a calling to public service; as well as fairness,
civility, and courtesy. 10 The stated goal was "to maintain and enhance the
role of [Maryland] legal professionals as protectors of the rule oflaw.,,11
While the principles set forth by the Commission are facially wellintentioned, the document is overly idealistic as it views the world oflaw,
lawyers, law practice, and legal professionalism through insular and
antiseptic rose-colored glasses. As Millie Jackson's lyrics entitled "Rose
Colored Glasses,,12 would suggest, such rose-colored glasses would show
mostly the good part of conventional legal professionalism and understate
the complex truth that many progressive lawyers would like to bring back
into the professionalism equation.
The Ideals of Professionalism do a good job of covering standard fare,
in their present form, but they are incomplete, rose-colored, and antiseptic
for our history. For one, the core values identified in the prefatory
definition of professionalism not only omit equally important values of
professional law practice such as justice, fairness, and fidelity to
resolving disputes, but also read like rose-colored glasses that show
mostly the good side but silence the problematic power-relations aspects.
Second, there is not a consensus conception of law, legality, profession,
and professionalism. Additionally, legal practice is not one size fits all as
legal professionals are not a homogeneous group who see their work and
the world the same way. Third, there is our historical and contemporary
experience ofthe ready amenability oflaw, the legal system, and the legal
profession to oppressive abuses and misuses. They range from the
legalized machinations of Nazi Germany, apartheid South Africa, and
American legalized historical racial and gender abuses, to the
contemporary realities of Bush-era enablement of torture, human rights
violations, privacy invasions, and negations of civil liberties. Practically,
the Ideals of Professionalism largely omit nonstandard but important,
timely, and progressive legal professionalism issues that it ought to have
named and addressed directly. For that matter, the document promoting
integrity and trustworthiness failed to formulate a clear protocol for
attenuating the major concern in our legal community and the larger
society that many lawyers are scandalous enablers of the rich and
powerful.
This article submits that these legitimate but silenced
professionalism issues must be addressed.
Moreover, it likely makes no practical difference whether such
legalized violations are effected "pursuant to law" or "under color of law"
once they become institutionalized through the legitimizing prerogatives

11

ld.
ld. at 2.

12

MILLIE JACKSON,

10

UK 1981).

Rose Colored Glasses, on JUST A LJ'L BIT COUNTRY (SouthBound
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and practices of the American Constitution and laws; the Congress and
legislators; the Presidency and executive administrators; as well as the
Supreme Court and the justices, judges, lawyers, and conventional legal
professionalism.
Like any good thing, there can be excessive
conventional representations of the ideals of professionalism to the point
of erasing any sense of the complex realities of professional law practice.
Accordingly, this article will attempt to highlight some of the
omissions and eloquent silences that act as a countervailing moral and
ethical imperative in the progressive practice of law and the higher ethical
conduct or portrayal of legal professionalism. Part II provides an
overview of the document of interest, namely, the Ideals of
Professionalism.
Part III briefly examines the concepts of law,
profession, and professionalism to set forth the framework for the
progressive critique. Part IV integrates the preceding sections to
delineate and analyze some of the important omissions and eloquent
silences of the Ideals of Professionalism.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE "IDEALS OF PROFESSIONALISM"

The "Ideals of Professionalism" (hereinafter "the Ideals") as
promulgated by the Commission on Professionalism and approved by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland on March 8, 20 I 0, is an eight-page
document divided into eight sections. 13 These sections are the prefatory
definition of professionalism's core values; a preamble; itemized ideals of
professionalism; accountability and trustworthiness; education,
mentoring, and excellence; a calling to service; fairness, civility, and
courtesy; and a concluding section that integrates the material in a
summary. 14
According to the opening prefatory definition,
"Professionalism is the combination of the core values of personal
integrity, competency, civility, independence, and public service that
distinguish lawyers as the caretakers of the rule oflaw.,,15 Thereafter, the
preface invokes the enabling or grandfathering statute for the Ideals,
stating that "[t]hese Ideals of Professionalism emanate from and
complement the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct
("MLRPC"), the overall thrust of which is well-summarized in ... the
Preamble to those Rules . . . ," which understandably echoes or evokes
the Ideals. 16
The Preamble to the Ideals begins with the weighty reminder that
Maryland

13

14

15
16

Ideals of Professionalism, supra note 6.
Id.
Id. at I (emphasis added).
Id.
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[l]awyers are entrusted with the privilege of practicing law. They
take a firm vow or oath to uphold the Constitution and laws of the
United States and the State of Maryland. Lawyers enjoy a
distinct position of trust and confidence that carries the significant
responsibility and obligation to be caretakers for the system of
justice that is essential to the continuing existence of a civilized
society. 17
The Preamble follows with the observation that as a custodian of the
system of justice, each lawyer "must be conscious of this responsibility
and exhibit traits that reflect a personal responsibility to recognize, honor,
and enhance the rule of law in this society.,,18 The Preamble ends by
emphasizing that the "Ideals and the characteristics set forth below are
representative of a value system that lawyers must demand of themselves
as professionals in order to maintain and enhance the role of legal
professionals as the protectors of the rule oflaw.,,19
Following the Preamble is a subheading itemizing specific standards
or Ideals of Professionalism. 20 They urge lawyers to aspire to put fidelity
to clients above their self-interests; to be a model of respect and regard
for clients and other disputants; and to seek equality and fairness by
avoiding all forms of wrongful discrimination in all activities. 21 They ask
lawyers to preserve, improve, and make available to all and for the
common good the law, the legal system, and other dispute resolution
processes. 22 They urge each lawyer to aspire to practice law with a
personal and mutually collegial commitment to the rules governing the
profession. 23 They ask each lawyer to preserve the generationally
inherited dignity and integrity of the profession by his or her conduct and
to strive for excellence in legal practice to promote the interests of clients,
the rule of law, and the welfare of society.24 Finally, they ask lawyers to
recognize that law practice is a calling in the spirit of public service rather
than merely a business pursuit. 25
The next section of the Ideals, titled "Accountability and
Trustworthiness," urges each lawyer to understand certain principles. 26
First, punctuality promotes a lawyer's credibility while tardiness and

~
17
18
19
20

21
22
23

24
25
26

ld. at 1-2.
ld. at 2.
Ideals of Professionalism, supra note 6, at 2.
ld.
ld.
ld. at 2-3.
ld. at 3.
ld.
Ideals of Professionalism, supra note 6, at 3.
ld.
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neglect denigrate the individual lawyer and the legal profession. 27
Second, personal integrity, by way of keeping one's commitments to
clients, opposing counsel, and the courts, is essential to the honorable
practice of law. 28 Third, honesty and candid communication, subject to
the legitimate limitation of confidentiality, promote credibility with
clients, opposing counsel, and the COurtS?9 Fourth, the lawyer must
scrupulously resist monetary pressures that cloud professional judgment
and thereby tax credibility and integrity. 30
The Ideals then move onto "Education, Mentoring, and Excellence.,,3l
This section instructs each lawyer to use continuing legal education
programs to remain current in legal knowledge and familiar with changes
in the law affecting a client's interests. 32 It asks lawyers to take on the
responsibility of promoting the image of the legal profession by
appropriately educating non-lawyers and showing the importance of
professionalism?3 It also implores senior lawyers to willingly mentor and
teach less experienced lawyers both by setting a good example and by
ensuring that each mentee learns and adheres to the principles enunciated
in the Ideals?4
In "A Calling to Service," the Ideals state that each lawyer should
serve the public interest by communicating clearly, promptly, openly, and
respectfully with clients, opposing counsel, and the courtS. 35 The Ideals
state that lawyers should be mindful of the impact of their actions on
others when scheduling events. 36 Further, lawyers should keep clients
informed of the status of important matters affecting them and the nature
and frequency of expected communication or information. 37 They also
state that each lawyer should always explain the client's options with
sufficient detail for the client to make an informed decision, be respectful
in all interactions with clients, opposing counsel, staff, and the courts, as
well as "accept responsibility for ensuring that justice is available to
everyone and not just those with financial means.,,38
Next, "Fairness, Civility, and Courtesy" states that a lawyer should act
fairly, civilly, and courteously in all dealings as a way to promote the
system of justice and zealously promote the client's interests without
27

28
29
30

31
32
33

34
35

36
37

38

Id
Id.
Id at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Ideals of Professionalism, supra note 6, at 4.
Id
Id
Id
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5
Ideals of Professionalism, supra note 6, at 5.
Id. at 5.
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recourse to underhanded yelling, intimidation, and other bullying
tactics. 39 This section also asks each lawyer to remain objective in
advising each client on the strengths and weaknesses of his or her case
and not to allow the lawyer's actions or advice to become a tool for a
client's improper motives, unethical directions, animosity toward an
opposing party, or ill-advised wishes. 40 Moreover, this section asks
lawyers to use negotiation and alternative dispute resolution to achieve a
client's objectives as appropriate, to use litigation tools to strengthen a
client's case but not to harass, burden, or intimidate an opposing party,
and as a matter of fairness, to note explicitly any changes to documents
submitted for review by opposing counsel. 41
Lastly, a concluding section rounds out the Ideals in a summary
fashion by stating that a lawyer should understand that professionalism
requires civility in all dealings, respect and empathy for different points
of view, and showing courtesy and maintaining decorum in the court. 42
Lawyers enhance professionalism by "preparing scrupulously for
meetings and court appearances and by showing respect for the court,
opposing counsel, and the parties through courteous behavior and
respectful attire. ,.43 Lawyers should demonstrate courtesy and respect in
all contexts, including with clients and colleagues, in the courtroom, with
support staff, and with court personnel. 44 "Hostility between clients
should not become grounds for a lawyer to show hostility or disrespect to
a party, opposing counsel, or the court.,,45 Patience enables the lawyer to
exercise restraint, defuse anger, and reduce tension and animosity
between parties or lawyers in volatile situations. 46 "[T]he Ideals of
Professionalism are to be observed in all manner of communication, and a
lawyer should resist the impulse to respond uncivilly to electronic
communications in the same manner as he or she would resist such
impulses in other forms of communication.,,47
We turn now to the part of this article that broaches multidimensional
conceptions of law, profession, and professionalism to set forth the
analytic framework that helps lay bare some of the important omissions
and eloquent silences. The hope is that the Maryland Bar and Bench
would appreciate that the thoughtful and well-intentioned document in
place today is nonetheless incomplete. In candor, the document is still a
39
40
41

42
43
44

45
46
47

!d. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Ideals of Professionalism, supra note 6, at 7.
Id.
Id.
!d. at 8.
Id.
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work in progress because in its present form, it has, as it were, left for
another day (as many courts would!) some of the issues and concerns that
either were never properly before the Commission or could be better
handled at a different time or occasion. It is anybody's guess when that
other time or occasion may arrive and whose criteria will be used to
decide what is "properly before the Commission." It will suffice to say
that being mindful of unfinished business sometimes makes one more
circumspect about overstating even a working masterpiece.
III.

OPERATING CONCEPTIONS OF LAW, PROFESSION, AND
PROFESSIONALISM
A. Multidimensional Conception ofLaw

We start delineating our analytic framework by first considering the
relevant conceptions of law because the purpose of the Ideals is
ultimately to convey how best to practice law as a noble profession. For
present purposes, we propose a five-fold conception of law that we hope
broadly reflects the myriad approaches in jurisprudential literature. This
is no elective work because unless we ask the necessary questions or raise
the relevant issues, we would never broach the appropriate answers or the
reasonable resolutions to the omissions and silences of interest here.
Functional analytically speaking, law is the ordered process or
institutional framework for effecting governmental social control,48
resolving particular disputes, and modulating general social conflicts. 49
Analytic-jurisprudentially speaking, law is that command, order, or
normative stipulation backed by an express or implied threat of
punishment for failure to obey or comply. 50 Under a critical or legal
realist analytical approach, law not only refers to context-driven valuebased decisions made by judges and other authorized officials to resolve
disputes,SI but also represents politics (i.e., the imperatives of power and
resource allocation) by other means in a similar fashion as war is politics
and diplomacy by alternate means. 52 Under the post-modernist analytical
approach, law is knowledge-power or expert-skill-power encoded as
discourse, discursive practice, rhetoric, and symbolic representation in
48
DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW (Academic Press 1976). See also Jack P.
Gibbs, Law as a Means of Social Control, SOCIAL CONTROL: VIEWS FROM THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 83 (Jack P. Gibbs ed., 1982).
49
BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT (Carolina Academic Press 5th ed.
1997).
50
Gibbs, supra note 48, at 89 (referencing exponents of analytic jurisprudence like John
Austin, Max Weber, E. Adamson Hoebel and Hans Kelsen).
51
Id. at 91 (referencing exponents oflegal realism like Oliver Wendel Holmes, Kurt N.
Llewellyn, and Jerome Frank).
52 See generally MICHAEL MANDEL, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF
POLITICS IN CANADA (Thompson Educ. Publishers, Inc. rev. ed., 1994).
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historically specific sites and modalities of enunciation. 53 From this
vantage point, lawyers are traders, who cater mostly to the powerful,
occasionally promoting the rule of law or maintaining law and order in
the contexts of tangible social, economic, political, and cultural
inequalities and conflicts. 54
For its part, natural law jurisprudence views law as the right-oriented,
morally just, or justifiable enterprise of governing human behavior in
accordance with clear and consistent rules, procedures, and principles of
legality. 55 Law refers to those morally grounded propositional principles
that govern the application of rules, based on past legal practice, to
discern the morally justifiable unique correct answer to particular
disputes or questions. 56 Or else, legal claims are principle driven and
constructive interpretive judgments combine retrospective and
prospective elements of past official action and judicial practice in an
unfolding narrative seeking to discern the best possible moral answer to
particular disputes or questions. 57 In the process of such a constructive
interpretation, which necessarily involves assigning value or purpose to
the interpretation, the presumed purpose of law is to "constrain or justify
the exercise of governmental power.,,58 Integrity in law, and thus in legal
practice and legal professionalism, results best from interpretations that
give the law a coherent moral vision, that is, interpretations that "express
a coherent conception of justice and faimess.,,59
The aim has been to emphasize that there is no unitary conception of
law or legality, the very subject matter of legal practice and legal
professionalism. Rather, there are equally legitimate and competing
conceptions of law and legality that have far-reaching implications for
lawyers, law practice, and legal professionalism. Arguably, appreciating
and providing for the nuances and ramifications of the differing
conceptions of law and legality, even if by way of annotations and
mUltiple tracking, ultimately would be more complete and realistic for the
everyday world of the legal profession. We tum now to consider the
competing conceptions of a profession to appreciate and provide for the
53
See generally LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD: TRANSLATION AND TRANSGRESSION
(Maureen Cain & Christine B. Harrington eds., N.Y. Univ. Press 1994).
54 ld.
55
BIX, supra note 49, at 82-86 (referencing a major historical exponent of Natural Law
Theory, Lon Fuller).
56
ld. at 87-89 (referencing 'the Right Answer thesis' as contained in the early writings of
a major contemporary exponent of natural law theory. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (1977).
57
BIX, supra note 49, at 89-91 (referencing "the principle of Best Fit Answer" as
contained in the later work of a major contemporary exponent of natural law theory. See
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1986).
58
BIX, supra note 49, at 91.
59 ld.
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complexities of the real world of law, lawyers, and professional law
practice.
B. Multidimensional Conception ofProfession

Generally, when we speak in terms of a job, an employment, a career,
an occupation, or a profession, we seek to characterize the work people
do part-time or full-time for income, advancement in rank, personal
growth and fulfillment, service to others, and the pursuit of socially
valued resources of power, wealth, and prestige. 6o While for present
purposes we shall consider an occupation as simply the work or
employment in which an individual is engaged to earn a living, the more
profound notion of a profession is quite a preeminent sociological
phenomenon. 6 I What, then, is a profession? Disregard for now the
satirical but suggestive medical service inspired quip made by 1925
literary Nobel Laureate, George Bernard Shaw, to the effect that
professions "are all conspiracies against the laity.,,62 Roughly half a
century ago, respected authority Professor A. M. Carr-Saunders, who was
fondly known as "the fine British student of the professions," opined that
ONWUEME&GABRIEL-UGBOR,supranote l,at 112-13.
Id. at 113. Further, all three major classical sociologists representing conservative,
liberal, and radical orientations grappled with the professions and occupational groups as key
aspects of the then emerging industrial social organization between the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. For the more conservative Emile Durkheim, it was in terms of the social
stability and social change effects of the division of labor (i.e., occupational differentiation
and specialization), including the professional associations that he believed were like a middle
entity between the individual and the more distant national government. For the liberalconservative pragmatic Max Weber, it was in terms of the rise of skilled and credentialed
experts and professionals as propertied middle classes, as well as the rise of formal
organizations and the increasing specialization, bureaucratization, and rationalization of social
life. For the radical Karl Marx, it was in terms of the headache posed to his program of class
consciousness, class conflict, class struggle, and socialist transformation by the ambiguous
petty-bourgeois class of skilled professionals and intellectuals. See generally SHAUN BEST, A
BEGINNER'S GUIDE TO SOCIAL THEORY (Sage Publications Ltd. 2003) (2004); GEORGE RITZER,
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (McGraw-Hill 2008) (1983).
62
GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, THE DOCTOR'S DILEMMA: WITH A PREFACE ON DOCTORS
(Penguin Books 1957) (1946). Apparently, George Bernard Shaw had a bad experience
having a toe nail problem fixed by doctors whom he believed covered each other's
malpractice and had an antisocial vested interest in peoples' ill health! Shaw also was
reflecting on a situation in which an investigative journalist posed as an influenza patient for a
major London newspaper and got different advice and prescriptions from the eminent
physicians in the city at the end of the nineteenth century. "But the effect of this state of
things is to make the medical profession a conspiracy to hide its own shortcomings. No doubt
the same may be said of all professions. They are all conspiracies against the laity; and 1 do
not suggest that the medical conspiracy is either better or worse than the military conspiracy,
the legal conspiracy, the sacerdotal conspiracy, the pedagogic conspiracy, the royal and
aristocratic conspiracy, the literary and artistic conspiracy, and the innumerable industrial,
commercial, and financial conspiracies, from the trade unions to the great exchanges, which
make up the huge conflict which we call society. But it is less suspected." /d. at 17-18
(emphasis added.).
60

61
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a profession is "an occupation based upon specialized intellectual study
and training, the purpose of which is to supply skilled service or advice to
others for a definite fee or salary.,,63 An even more glorious and
contemporary rendition posits that a "profession is a vocation founded
upon specialized educational training the purpose of which is to supply
disinterested counsel and service to others, for a direct and definite
compensation, wholly apart from expectation of other business gain.,,64
Notwithstanding that society pejoratively refers to prostitution as the
oldest profession, the historical fact is that classically there were only
three professions: divinity, law, and medicine. 65 Generally speaking, and
leaving aside the broader functionalist (conservative), interactional
(liberal), and conflict (radical) perspectives,66 there are four conceptual
approaches to understanding professions in the relevant literature. First,
there is the typical trait approach, which would list upwards of ten
characteristics of a profession for examining a particular occupation or
profession of interest. 67 Second, there is the related historical-descriptive
ONWUEME & GABRIEL-UGBOR, supra note I, at lB.
COMPETITION COMMISSION, ARCHITECTS' SERVICES, ch. 7, para. 123 (1977),
available at http://www.competition-commission.org.ukirepjlub/reports/1976_I 979/fulltext!
108c07.pdf.
65 R.W. PERKS, ACCOUNTING AND SOCIETY 2 (Chapman & Hall 1993) as cited in the
Wikipedia entry for "Profession", http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilProfession (last visited Mar.
17,2011).
66
A theoretical perspective is a broad assumption about society, social organization, and
social or human behavior that forms a point of view for studying, examining, explaining, or
analyzing particular social phenomena, issues, or problems. The "Functionalist Perspective"
assumes that society or the social system, much like biological organisms, is made of a
structure of interdependent parts, each of which has a consequence or function for the orderly
survival, maintenance, and incremental progress of the whole system. It is a conservativereactionary or big-picture orientation. The "Interactional Perspective" holds that society or
social experience comes down to those small-scale social structures and processes,
transactions, or interactions by which people act toward, respond to, and influence one another
in everyday life. It is a liberal-pragmatic or small-is-beautiful orientation. For its part, the
"Conflict Perspective" views society or social formation as an arena of struggle, conflict, and
change, fostered through and by various social classes and social conflict groups, over socially
valued but scarce resources such as power, wealth, and prestige. This is a critical-progressive
macro-level or big picture orientation. See generally BEST, supra note 61; RITZER, supra note
63

64

61.
67
While the so-called Characteristics of a Profession can range between seven and ten, a
rather extensive and almost exhaustive list appears under the entry for "Profession" in the
online encyclopedia, Wikipedia, as highlighted below:
I. Skill based on theoretical knowledge;
2. Professional association;
3. Extensive period of education;
4. Testing of competence;
5. Institutional training;
6. Licensed practitioners;
7. Work autonomy;
8. Code of professional conduct or ethics;
9. Self-regulation;
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approach, which seeks to establish the historical sequence or stages
through which an occupation acquires the characteristics of a
profession. 68 Third, there is the ideal-type analytic approach, which uses
two major analytic criteria, namely, control of entry and service by the
organized profession and practitioner autonomy in rendering the service,
in locating occupational groups on an occupation-profession continuum,
with law and medicine as the ideal-type, classic professions. 69
Fourth, there is the power-structural analytic approach, one version of
which fundamentally sees the professions as pressure groups that seek to
maximize their power and privilege in society.70 Based on this approach,
the service ideals and codes of ethics exist as much for the public interest
as for the personal and professional interests in securely maximizing
socially valued resources of power, wealth, and prestige. Similarly, entry
regulations such as credentials, professional exams, licensure, and
accreditation exist not simply to provide clients with high caliber service,
but to also serve as a gate-keeping strategy to minimize competition and
enable practitioners to maximize the return on their investment through a
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Public service and altruism;
Exclusion, monopoly and legal recognition;
Control of remuneration and advertising;
High status and rewards;
Individual clients;
Middle-class occupations;
Male-dominated;
Ritual;
Legitimacy;
Inaccessible body of knowledge;
Indeterminacy of knowledge.

Wikipedia, Profession, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilProfession (last visited March 15,2011).
68
Terrence J. Johnson has ably criticized this approach for being only marginally
analytic and for canvassing a misleading idea of the "natural history of professionalism" that
has produced contradictory results for the United States as compared to the United Kingdom.
For the United States, the historical sequence was: (I) a full-time occupation emerges; (2) a
training institution is established; (3) a professional association is founded; (4) state regulation
or legal protection is secured through political agitation; and (5) a formal code of ethics is
adopted. For the United Kingdom, the historical sequence was: (1) a professional association;
(2) change in the name of the occupation; (3) code of ethics; (4) agitation to obtain state
recognition or mandate; and (5) the concurrent development of training facilities. See
ONWUEME & GABRIEL-UGBOR, supra note 1, at 116 (following JOHNSON, supra at note 5, at
ch. 2). Another source on the American experience also identifies the historical milestones
through which an occupation became a profession as follows: (1) it became a full-time
occupation; (2) the first training school was established; (3) the first university school was
established; (4) the first local association was established; (5) the first national association was
established; (6) the codes of ethics were introduced; and (7) state licensing laws were
established. PERKS, supra at note 65, at 2.
69
Eric Hoyle, Professionality, Professionalism and Control in Teaching, in 1
MANAGEMENT IN EDUCATION, 314-15 (y. Houghton, et al. eds., 1975).
70
JOHNSON, supra note 5, at ch. 2.
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type of monopoly.71 The other version of the approach is Donald
Treiman's structural theory of occupational prestige, according to which
occupational prestige is ultimately rooted in power resources and
relations. 72 Validated with international comparative data, the key
propositions are that: (1) specialization through the division of labor in
society creates occupational differentials in power resources (expert and
technical knowledge, skills, authority, and wealth); (2) which in tum
produce differentials in occupational privilege (autonomy, trust,
independent judgment, working conditions, etc.); and (3) the two together
result in differentials in occupational prestige. 73
Once again, the point has been to appreciate that there is no unitary
conception of a profession, the very phenomenon that is supposed to be
the horse and carriage of legal professionalism. As in the case of law and
legality, there exist equally legitimate and competing conceptions of a
profession that have far-reaching ramifications for lawyers, professional
law practice, and legal professionalism. Stripped to its fundamentals, the
notion of a profession is a multidimensional concept having prestigious
power resources and even monopolistic power relations, practitioner
autonomy, and self-governing control of entry and services at its heart
and soul. Arguably, there is nothing particularly angelic about such
attributes. Accepting this characterization would entail openness to the
numerous ramifications in the everyday world of lawyers, law practice,
and the legal profession. By extension, annotating, parallel tracking, or
otherwise customizing the discourse of legal professionalism to reflect
such ramifications would ultimately foster a more complete and realistic
discourse of legal professionalism for myriad practitioners. We tum now
to consider the all-important matter of professionalism itself.

C. Multidimensional Conception ofProfessionalism
Merriam-Webster's online dictionary defines professionalism rather
flippantly as "the conduct, aims, or qualities that characterize or mark a
profession or a professional.,,74 An online source oriented to the
commercial world, BusinessDictionary.com, is much more forthcoming
in defining professionalism as the "[m ]eticulous adherence to undeviating
courtesy, honesty, and responsibility in one's dealings with customers
and associates, plus a level of excellence that goes over and above the
71 JOHNSON, supra note 5, at ch. 2; see MAGALI S. LARSON, THE RiSE OF
PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977); see also YVES DEZALAY & DAVID
SUGARMAN, PROFESSIONAL COMPETITION AND PROFESSIONAL POWER (1995).
72 ONWUEME & GABRIEL-UGBOR, supra note 1, at 120-21. Accord DONALD J. TREIMAN,
OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1-19 (1977).
73 ONWUEME & GABRIEL-UGBOR, supra note 1, at 120-22.
74
Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.comldictionary/professionalism (last
visited March 25, 2011).
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commercial considerations and legal requirements.,,75 For its part, the
Ideals open with a working prefatory definition of professionalism as "the
combination of the core values of personal integrity, competency, civility,
independence, and public service that distinguish lawyers as the
caretakers of the rule of law.,,76 Accordingly, regardless of the specific
definition, professionalism has to do with a passionate belief in, and
commitment to, one's professional roles and responsibilities as a lawyer,
together with the associated ideals, standards, values, principles, laws,
ethics, colleagues, organizations, and service to the public.
However, there still is a crucial aspect of the concept of
professionalism that must be acknowledged. At this point in our
discussion, I would like to introduce an analogy. Whenever I have
occasion to discuss the topic or idea of "postmodern social theory" 77 with
my upper-class undergraduate students, I usually begin by giving them a
conceptual anchor, frame of reference, or advance organizer as follows:
There is a debatable condition of post-modernity, an ongoing process of
post-modernization, and a dogged ideology or belief system of
postmodernism. I would invite them to try to do the same thing with the
related and flavorful topic of the global condition, globalization, and
globalism in contemporary social theory.78 I would then close by stating:
Even if we cannot conclude that the world is in a condition of postmodernity, reasonable people would at least agree that the process of
post-modernization is underway, and that regardless, the ideology or
belief system of postmodemism appears to be here to stay. Their smiling
faces and nodding heads would be all the feedback I needed before
inviting an open discussion on those topical flavors of contemporary
social theory.
Extrapolating and translating, there is the historically settled condition
of law practice being a profession and lawyers being professionals.
of
Furthennore,
the
historical
and
contemporary
process
professionalization may ebb and flow with changes in knowledge,
75
BusinessDictionary.com,
Professionalism,
http://www.businessdictionary.com/
definitionlprofessionalism.html (last visited March 25, 2011).
76
Ideals of Professionalism, supra note 6, at 1.
77
According to which we are living in a new era in which issues of culture and identity
predominate, economic activities and operations are globalized, and information and
communication technologies are constricting time and space and forging new forms of
communities, identities, and associations. However, the term "post-modernism" or "postmodernity" has come to mean many different things. "Some associate it with postindustrial
society, others with the post-Marxist world; still others view it as a movement in literary
criticism, and some view it as a legitimation of new voices in a diverse and multicultural
society." JAMES FARGANIS, READINGS IN SOCIAL THEORY 357 (McGraw-Hill 6th ed. 2011).
78
For a dizzying but rewarding digest of contemporary social theory, including the topics
of globalization and post-modem social theory, see generally BEST, supra note 61; RITZER,
supra note 61.
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technology, and the economy, but the ideology or belief system of legal
professionalism has a staying power regardless of other changes. Thus,
professionalism is an ideological practice or belief system in the same
manner as any other "isms" out there in the institutions, organizations,
and everyday realities of our social, cultural, political, and economic life.
Ideologies (e.g., the American Dream, the service ideal, and the rule of
law) are complex socio-political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural
phenomena that attempt to explain, justify, or rationalize prevailing
meanings, values, and practices. 79 Their complex socio-Iegal functions
include to mystify or demystify, to energize or de-energize, to enable or
disable, to mobilize or demoralize, to challenge or defend, and to promote
or undermine the affected groups, interests, priorities, or objectives.
Practically, it is like a sword and a shield, a fort or firewall from which to
play both offense and defense in the professional project of asserting and
guarding a monopolistic claim over some specified domain of social
life. 80 Little wonder that Terence J. Johnson firmly instructs that
professionalism is the entrenchment by practitioners and their selfgoverning organizations of institutionalized forms of occupational
control, autonomy, authority, ideology, and mystique. 81 Therein lie some
of the important unstated features of the professionalism ideals under
examination and critique herein.
Again, we see that professionalism is not a unitary or disinterested
idea. Rather, it is a multidimensional concept that is rife with important
questions of professional and practitioner self-interest, monopoly, power,
autonomy, ideology, mystique, and cultivated civility. Appreciating and
making provisions or allowances for how different lawyers, practice
groups, or practice niches might prefer or have to go about those aspects
of legal professionalism would likely make the Ideals more complete and
realistic for the myriad practitioners in today's society. The thought to
take and extend just the very crucial concomitant of professional
autonomy or independence is a feature that seems to be common to most
definitions of professionalism and the four various approaches to a
79
While the material conveyed here has been influenced during a course of two decades
of extended readings of the rather dense ideas orland writings of the likes of Ray Williams,
Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, and Michael Apple, the interested reader would find an
accessible exposition of the concept of ideology in the works of TERRY EAGLETON, IDEOLOGY:
AN INTRODUCTION (Verso Publishers 1991); DAVID HAWKES, IDEOLOGY (Routledge 2d ed.
2003). Even an online source, BusinessDictionary.com, defines ideology practically as a
"system of ideas that explains and lends legitimacy to actions and beliefs of a social, religious,
political,
or
corporate
entity."
BusinessDictionary.com,
Ideology,
http://www.businessdictionary.comldefinitionlideology.html (last visited March 25, 20 11).
80
See, e.g., GERALD LARKIN, OCCUPATIONAL MONOPOLY AND MODERN MEDICINE
(Tavistock Publications 1983).
81
JOHNSON, supra note 5, at ch. 4 (cited in ONWUEME & GABRIEL-UGBOR, supra note I,
at 114.
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profession indicated in a previous sub-section: the trait approach, the
historical-descriptive approach, the ideal-type analytic approach, and the
two-prong power-structural analytic approach. According to one source,
professionals are autonomous in the sense that they can make
independent judgments about their work. 82 A concurring source has
noted that professional autonomy is an essential characteristic of
professional ideology. 83 As such, professional autonomy is based on
three claims:
First, the work of professionals entails such a high degree of skill
and knowledge that only fellow professionals can make accurate
assessments of professional performance. Second, professionals
are characterized by such a high degree of selflessness and
responsibility that they can be trusted to work conscientiously.
Third, in the rare instance in which individual professionals do
not perform with sufficient skill or conscientiousness, their
colleagues may be trusted to undertake the proper regulatory
action. 84
Continuing, the source quickly advises that autonomy "has other
meanings.,,85 Specifically, "{p}rofessional autonomy is often described
as a claim of professionals that has to serve primarily their own
interests.,,86
Moreover, "this professional autonomy can only be
maintained if members of the profession subject their activities and
decisions to a critical evaluation by other members of the profession. ,,87
Thus, rather than simply serving the public interest, the concept of
autonomy embraces not only independent judgment, but also self-interest
and a continuous process of critical evaluation of ethics and procedures
from within the profession itself. 88

MICHAEL D. BAYLES, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (Wadsworth Publishing Co. 1981).
Sivakumar Velayutham & Hector Perera, The Historical Context of Professional
Ideology and Tension and Strain in the Accounting Profession, 22(1) ACCT. HISTORIANS J. 81,
95 \!une 1995).
ld.
85
Wikipedia, supra note 67 (citing J. Hoogland & H. Jochensen, Professional Autonomy
and the Normative Structure of Medical Practice, 21.5 THEORETICAL MED. 457, 457·75
(September 2000».
~6 Id.
87 ld.
88 !d.
82
83
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ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

A. General Analytic Thrusts and Premises
We can encapsulate our major analytic premises by distilling and
summarizing the general thrusts of the previous sections. First, the
subject matter predicate of law practice and the legal profession, law, or
legality is a multidimensional concept requiring corresponding nuances
and ramifications in any composite, realistic, and effective discourse of
legal professionalism for all practitioners. Strictly speaking, there are
dispute resolution, command-obeying, governmental social controloriented, value-driven decisional, political discursive encoding, clear and
consistent legality oriented, moral propositional, and justice-oriented
dimensions to law and legality. Second, the idea of a profession is a
multidimensional concept susceptible to various approaches from which
one can distill fundamentals that are not particularly angelic or saintly,
such as purported public service, prestigious and monopolistic power
relations, practitioner autonomy and independence, and self-governing
exclusionary control of entry and services. Consistent with the complex
and contradictory notion of a profession, neither legal practice nor the
legal profession that is the horse and carriage of legal professionalism
itself is "one size fits all." Analogous to competing and equally
legitimate conceptions of law and legality, there are competing and
equally legitimate professional law practice dimensions, orientations,
niches, values, interests, imperatives, and priorities. These dimensions
require corresponding nuances and ramifications in any composite,
realistic, and effective discourse of legal professionalism for all
practitioners. Third, as the propeller shaft for legality, the rule of law,
legal practice, and the legal profession, professionalism is not a unitary or
disinterested idea. Instead, professionalism is a multidimensional concept
entrenched by the profession and practitioners with many socially
problematic questions of power, autonomy, ideology, mystique, and
cultivated civility. Again, appreciating and providing for the nuances and
implications of those complex and contradictory dynamics would
certainly make for a more complete, realistic, and effective discourse of
legal professionalism for all practitioners who understandably do not
always look at their work the same way.

B. Particular Applications and Discussions
i. Incomplete Core Values
The core values of professionalism identified in the prefatory
definition of the Ideals are incomplete in that they omit and silence
equally legitimate and competing core values of law, legal practice, and
legal professionalism. Specifically, there is no mention of equity, justice,
and fairness as core values oflaw, legal practice, or legal professionalism.
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This omission is rather surprising because these values should actually be
both our moral and ethical imperative as lawyers and legal professionals.
If nothing else, our inquiry into the hydra-headed concept of law
evidences that there are value-driven, moral propositional, and justice and
fairness dimensions to law and legality. As 1991 Burmese Human Rights
Nobel Laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi, would say, the intrinsic virtue to law
is really its capacity to foster a sense of justice understood as fundamental
fairness. 89 The intrinsic virtue to law's concomitant order is the reflective
discipline of a people satisfied that justice has been done, can be done,
and will be done. 90 Thus, in formulating a more composite, realistic, and
effective discourse of legal professionalism for all practitioners, the core
values of equity, justice, and fairness must be constitutive of our
operational definition of professionalism consistent with the legitimate
professional law practice groups, dimensions, orientations, niches, values,
interests, imperatives, and priorities that they reflect or represent. Neither
law text and talk nor the discourse of professionalism would be complete
without directly naming and claiming such values as fundamental
constitutive features.
There is also no mention of fidelity or commitment to resolving
disputes or conflicts as a core value. Again, this is surprising as many of
us know or have reason to know that some lawyers actually persist in
making disputes worse at the expense of our collective and individual
reasonableness, sincerity, honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness as
professionals. We certainly saw a problem-solving, dispute-resolving, or
conflict-modulating dimension to law and legality, which law practice
and legal professionalism should expressly mirror as a core value. For
that matter, it taxes professionalism's stated core value of civility or
courtesy when a practitioner fully intending on resolving particular
disputes fairly, justly, and expeditiously is forced to endure the
procedural abuses and tactical maneuvers of another practitioner whose
only well-compensated interest is to stall the proceedings and frustrate the
other side. Meanwhile, a non-interventionist court typically would
indulge such ways and means of the adversarial Anglo-American system,
which further drains the wellspring of patience and civility relative to
opposing counsel, other litigants, witnesses, and the affected public.
Regardless, as the law and some family and domestic relations disputants
may rightly characterize such a scenario of abuse of power and internal
contradictions as irreconcilable differences, the arising legal practice
transactional conflicts may appear in forms the Ideals could mistakenly
try to exhaust unsuccessfully with the language of civility and courtesy.
With respect, while those are certainly important professional qualities to
89
90

AUNG SAN Suu KYI,
See id.

FREEDOM FROM FEAR

(Michael Aris ed., 2d ed. 1995).
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be "cultivated" and "exhibited" in all circumstances, the operational
dynamics and power-discursive elements are arguably so complex that
only a multidimensional discourse of professionalism could capture the
myriad nuances and commitments justly, fairly, and equitably. In sum,
the aforementioned discussion suggests that the Ideals neglected or failed
to formulate a clear protocol for attenuating the major concern in our
community that lawyers and the legal profession are scandalous enablers
of the rich and powerful.

ii. Rose-Colored Omissions and Silences
Nevertheless, the core values of professionalism identified in the
prefatory definition that opens the Ideals appear to view law, lawyers, law
practice, and the legal profession through rose-colored glasses. The
tendered core values and ideals mostly show good sides of legal
professionalism as "independence, public service, caretakers, and rule of
law," but the Ideals are otherwise mum about such underbellies as
collective and practitioner self-interested exclusionary and monopolistic
control of entry and services, let alone the prestigious and potentially
abusive power and wealth associated with the same. As a reminder, the
ultimate focus is ethics and professional responsibility. Ethics, properly
understood, means much more than mere compliance with the Maryland
Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct, from which the Ideals both
emanate and complement according to the prefatory section of the Ideals.
Thus, and hold your breath if you may, it is at least debatable that lawyers
are not simply "caretakers," "custodians," "guardians," "protectors of the
rule of law," or "protectors of the system of justice" as the Ideals
eloquently avers.
The ideology and mystique of "caretakers,"
"guardians," and "public service" understates the individual and
collective self-interest of the legal profession in serving mostly the paying
or well-heeled public. Similarly, the mere exhortation to make law
available to everyone does not equal a general professional mandate or a
specific practitioner obligation to furnish legal representation to the
economically underprivileged members of the same public whose interest
the Ideals purportedly serve as stated in the Ideals of Professionalism and
A Calling to Service sections.
Even more importantly, the Ideals omit and silence the reality that
lawyers are excluders and gate-keepers of access to the citadels of power
and state-legitimated authority euphemistically called the rule of law, but
also known as the relations of ruling. Even assuming that the focus is on
the rule of law, by now we can legitimately ask such rule and law a
number of questions. Let us improvise some dramatized accompaniment
with apologies to the bashful Bar and Bench. "This tribunal would like to
get some direct and cross-examination on the record. May the witness
called the 'Rule of Law' take the stand please? Bailiff, you may now
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swear in the witness. SirlMa'am, do you understand that you are under
oath? Under the penalty of perjury, this tribunal obligates you to tell the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Do you understand
that?" "Yes, your honor." "'The rule of what law?' is the fundamental
question for you here. Is it the law of dispute resolution, the law of
command backed by threat, or the law of moral-propositional right
answer principle? Alternatively, is it the law of governmental social
control, or the law of governing human conduct by clear and consistent
principles of legality? Or is it the law of avenging norm violation, the
law of discursive power and symbol trading for established interests, or
the law of politics by other means with all the implications for
domination, oppression, and even exploitation? Do, or should, all
practitioners necessarily expect, want, or have to be caretakers, guardians,
or custodians for all those types of rule of law too? For that matter, could
the 'rule' just as well be 'of the integrity-enhancing constructiveinterpretive 'law' of equity, justice, and fairness, which we indicated
should be a core ethical value or imperative of legal professionalism
multidimensionally understood? Which one is it, Mr.lMs. Rule of Law?
Is the witness taking the 5th or reserving testimony until the further
advice of counsel? You may step down, SirlMa'am."
iii. Axiomatic Exhortation Without Needed Qualifications

There is a much more urgent and present danger on this all-important
question of what rule and which law is unstated in the axiomatic
Preamble to the Ideals. From our well-documented historical and
contemporary experience of the legal system and the legal profession,
there is an imperative moral and ethical qualification missing from the
Preamble to the Ideals. The Preamble states as axiomatic or self-evident
that:
Lawyers are entrusted with the privilege of practicing law. They
take a firm vow or oath to uphold the Constitution and laws of the
United States and the State of Maryland. Lawyers enjoy a
distinct position of trust and confidence that carries the significant
responsibility and obligation to be caretakers for the system of
justice that is essential to the continuing existence of a civilized
society. Each lawyer, therefore, as a custodian of the system of
justice, must be conscious of this responsibility and exhibit traits
that reflect a personal responsibility to recognize, honor, and
enhance the rule of law in this society.91
All this weighty exhortation is as well and good as it is axiomatic or selfevident. Even if by way of annotation or annex though, the one major
91

Ideals of Professionalism, supra note 6, at 1-2.
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qualification this author would strongly recommend is that upholding the
Constitution and laws or enhancing the rule of law be subject to the
countervailing value and principle of conscientious objection whenever
and wherever such Constitution or laws command or accessorize morally
or ethically repugnant, degrading, or oppressive conduct. The magic
language is "providing that such Constitution, laws, rules, regulations, or
associated policies do not command complicity in, or obedience to, racial
oppression, gender subordination, social discrimination, economic
exploitation, political repression, genocide, ethnic cleansing, pogroms,
war crimes, crimes against humanity, grave human rights violations, or
mass atrocities of any kind, shape, or form." A related qualification this
author would strongly recommend would be to insert an express
provision requiring lawyers, judges, and judicial and adjudicative
tribunals to refrain from accessorizing or obliging any laws, rules,
regulations, or executive actions that directly or indirectly facilitate
governmental abuse of power, torture, or similar human rights violations.
The two major qualifications strongly recommended above are
obviously borne out of the lived and experienced worlds of law, the legal
system, and legal professionalism past and present. Some legal scholars
have claimed that the German legal system under Nazi rule so
compromised procedural practices that there was no rule of law to
generate a moral obligation to comply. 92 However, that is an overly
impetuous presumption. The reality is that the law or the legal system is
a chameleon. Therefore, both oppressors and liberators would find
something for them in it. For the same reasons that the devil can cite the
scripture for his purposes (to echo the mischievous William
Shakespeare), the despot or tyrant would decipher, author, or enact some
law to further his or her aggression. The truth is that there was some
enacted law, rule, regulation, or policy authorizing virtually everything,
including the good, the bad, and the ugly, done by, for, or in the name of
the Nazi regime. 93 At least in terms of an ordered or orderly process that
92
BIX, supra note 49, at 12 (stating that respected legal philosopher, Ronald Dworkin,
transformed or muted the debate between disputing scholars by showing that the opposite
claims are both reasonable and compatible perspectives on German Nazi law and legality).
93 DAVID J. HOGAN ET AL., THE HOLOCAUST CHRONICLE: A HISTORY IN WORDS AND
PICTURES (Publications International, Ltd., 1st ed. 2001); Lucy S. DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR
AGAINST THE JEWS 1933- 1945 (Collier McMillan 10th ed. 1986). Together with the other
myriad decrees, rules and regulations passed by the German Nazi government, the famous
Nuremberg Laws of 1933 are legion, even excluding the thirteen later amendments.
Noteworthy "laws" in the Nuremburg Laws of 1933 include the Law for the Protection of
German Blood and German Honor, the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil
Service, and the Law Against the Overcrowding of German Schools and Institutions of Higher
Learning. To help ensure political repression, the National Press Law served to squelch the
morally courageous, professionally ethical, and politically determined discursive resistance of
some progressive-conservative yet anti-oppressive journalists of the Munich Post, including
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the legal system, law enforcement, lawyers, and legitimated laws and
regulations typically make possible, the Nazi regime was quite efficient at
running a massive bureaucracy and following protocol. Reportedly, too,
even while wearing the banner of organized and disciplined
professionalism, the German legal system and the vast majority of
German jurists and lawyers quickly accommodated or adapted themselves
to the dictates and proclivities of the Nazi regime. 94 Additionally, even
long after World War II, apartheid South Africa distinguished itself in
entrenching and working the machinery of racial oppression, political
repression, and economic exploitation with the active participation of its
Constitution and laws, legal system, the judiciary, and the legal
profession with a good dose of professionalism to boot. 95
Moreover, even after the Bill of Rights had been ratified in 1791, the
Constitution and the laws of the United States and the State of Maryland
Erhard Auer, Fritz Gerlich, Martin Gruber, Edmund Goldschagg, and Julius Zerfass.
Unreserved acknowledgment is due to Erhard Auer in particular. Before being "disappeared"
by Hitler's henchmen, he tirelessly reconfigured conventional journalism training and
professionalism to expose the schemes and machinations of the Nazi Party and leadership
through a combination of savvy investigative and tabloid-style articles between 1923 and
1933. HOGAN, supra, at 23-25.
"Nazi" is a contraction for National Socialists, which full Western-style democratic and
civilized political party name was National Socialist German Workers' Party. /d. The Nazi
regime successfully passed The Enabling Act to the Nuremberg Laws on March 23, 1933 with
more than the two-thirds majority Hitler needed in the German legislature, the Reichstag. ld.
By so doing, a professional legislative body in a Western-style democracy and civilized
society gave the executive branch the legal authority to enact any laws or decrees it considered
necessary and proper to promote and safeguard the interests of the nation for the following
four years. ld. Rather than responding to the immediacy of a September 11, 2001-style
terrorist attack, the Nazi regime had a composite and longer-term goal of promoting Nordic or
Aryan racial purity, galvanizing the distressed German economy, and restoring the historic
glory of both the German military and German territorial polity. Jd.
94
See HOGAN, supra note 93, at 101.
95
Something approaching an expose will be found in ANTHONY H. RICHMOND, GLOBAL
APARTHEID: REFUGEES, RACISM AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (Oxford Univ. Press, 1st ed.
1994). "When the Nationalist Party came to power in South Africa in 1948, building on
existing forms of discrimination and segregation, it proceeded to create the system that came
to be known as 'apartheid.' In defending the South African Group Areas Act in 1951, then
President Dr. Malan argued that it was essential to keep the groups apart in order to maintain
'racial peace'. . .. This inequality has been maintained by systemic discrimination beginning
with the Labor Regulations Act of 1913, which created the 'reserves,' later to be described as
'homelands,' confining the African popUlation to 13 per cent of the total area of the country.
Subsequent legislation, up to and including the Influx Control Act (1986), regulated the
movement of people into urban areas. Other measures included the Blacks (Urban Areas)
Consolidation Act (1945), the Population Registration Act (1950), which required everyone to
carry racially classified identification, the Group Areas Acts (1950 and 1966), and the
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (1951). Added to these were a series of [administrative,
regulatory and policy] measures entrenching the dominant economic and political power of
the 'White' popUlation by denying full citizenship and franchise, suppressing political
opposition, and restricting access to education and social rights .... " ld. at 208-09.
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still disenfranchised and relegated women to the status of non-persons
unable to vote or be voted for until the 19th Amendment in 1920. 96 The
United States also promoted and protected racial slavery by expressly
safeguarding the importation of such persons as chattel slaves until 1808
under Article 1, section 9 of the Constitution,97 while slavery was not
prohibited outright until 1865 by the 13th Amendment. 98 Even then, the
Constitution and laws continued to endorse racial slavery by reducing
African Americans to three-fifth of a person for electoral population base
calculations under Article 1, section 2.99 This was not changed until 1868
by section 2 of the 14th Amendment. 100
For that matter, legal professionalism, an overly praised and
generationally inherited masterpiece existed in 1857 when the respected
Frederick, Maryland native lawyer and Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, Roger Taney, authored the racially abusive and oppressive Dred
Scott Decision. 101 Acknowledging historical realities, it certainly took the
professional competency, civility, and decorum of eminent Supreme
Court justices in a civilized society to hold, while hiding behind the socalled state action doctrine, that corporations and businesses could
continue racially abusive discrimination in 1883.102 Furthermore, it
certainly took the cultivated competency, civility, independence, and
public service of many respected lawyers and eminent Supreme Court
justices to formulate the racially abusive separate-but-equal doctrine
under the Plessy v. Ferguson opinion of 1896.103 This glorified and
generational historic professionalism was in place when the University of
Maryland School of Law and the legal profession would not admit
women or African Americans, including Thurgood Marshall. The
Constitution and laws of both the United States and the State of Maryland
not only "exhibited" slave codes and, later, post-abolition Jim Crow laws

96
97
98
99

u.S. CaNST. amend. XIX.
U.S. CaNST., art. 1, § 9 (repealed 1808).
U.S. CaNST. amend. XIII.
U.S. CaNST., art. 1, § 2 repealed by U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § 2.
100
U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § 2.
101
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). This decision held that persons of
African ancestry, whether slave or free, were not and could not be American citizens under the
Declaration of Independence. ld It also held that such persons could not sue to win their
freedom in federal courts because they had no standing under the diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction of the federal courts pursuant to law. ld. It declared that slaves were chattel
whose owners Congress could not deprive of their property rights without due process oflaw
as guaranteed by the Constitution. ld It also held that Congress did not even have the
Constitutional authority to prohibit slavery in federal territories. Jd
102
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
103
163 U.S. 537 (1896). The case held that legalized racial apartheid in public
transportation or rail way carts was Constitutional as long as facilities were equal, a ruling
which any thinking person would know was patently dishonest. ld.

2011]

The Idealist Discourse of Legal Professionalism

143

of legalized racial discrimination,l04 but they also aided racial oppression,
subordination, and violence against socially marginalized Blacks, Asians,
Hispanics, Native Americans, Jews, and so-called White ethnics from
southern, central, and eastern European countries. lOS All this happened
under the watchful eyes of the historically prevailing conventional or
idealist legal professionalism that we insist is in need of overhaul and
recalibration for our time and era.
Furthermore, there is the contemporary American experience of
legalized torture, privacy invasions, and negations of civil rights and
liberties that exists under the advice and guidance of prominent and
respected professional lawyers, judges, lawyer-politicians, and legal
policy advisers. However, out of every crisis in the history of a people
comes a deepening of insight into the true nature of human beings and the
human society. The same also holds true for law, legality, lawyers, the
legal profession, the legal system, and conventional idealist
professionalism. As the former totalitarian Soviet communist empire
emerged after World War II, there also emerged a corresponding
American historical example of legalized political repression, anticommunist witch-hunts, invasions of privacy, and violations of civil
rights during the hearings conducted by Senator Joseph McCarthy. That
was part of the unqualified rule of law in a civilized society under the
watchful eyes of its appointed guardians, custodians, and caretakers.
Nearly one half century later, when Americans were confronted with the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a substantial part of the true rather
than fair-weather nature of our society, culture, interpreted Constitution,
enacted laws, and the justice system emerged again. Almost overnight,
the idealist values and platitudes of our conventional rule of law and
diplomacy quickly receded when the power-discursive politics of safety
and security became front-page material. It soon became obvious that
many legal professionals in senior justice and administrative positions
would readily approve unprovoked or preemptive State aggression, war,
invasions of privacy, deprivations of civil liberties, violations of human
rights, and torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment against real
or imagined enemies. 106
104
See, e.g., Verne Ilia R. Randall, Race, Racism and the Law; Examples of Jim Crow
Laws, http://academic.udayton.eduirace/02rights/jcrow02.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
105
See generally JOE R. FEAGIN, SYSTEMIC RACISM: A THEORY OF OPPRESSION (Routledge
2006) and MARTIN N. MARGER, RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES (Wadsworth Publishing Co., 8th ed. 2008).
106
The two definitive references on the subject are PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM:
RUMSFELD'S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES (Palgrave Macmillan 2008)
and JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION (W.W. Norton & Co., 2007). For some of the standard operating
procedures, see the incisive work by so-called American terrorism czar, RICHARD A. CLARKE,
AGAINST ALL ENEMIES (Free Press 2004).
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In addition to the detainee and prisoner abuses and scandals at both
Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, which were militarily unnecessary,
horrendous activities including extra-judicial killings, extra-ordinary
rendition, torture, simulated drowning or "water-boarding," "enhanced
interrogation," preventive detention without charge or trial, and tainted
military tribunals became the practiced nature of law, legality, and justice
in America. 107 Collaborating with very senior lawyers in the Justice
Department, then White House Chief Legal Counsel, and later U.S.
Attorney General for the Bush administration, Alberto Gonzales, advised
that the Geneva Conventions were quaint and obsolete and so-called
"enemy combatants" were not entitled to prisoner-of-war status under the
Geneva Conventions, which would necessarily grant them certain
protections. 108 With the concurrence of U.S. Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales, the Dick Cheney-Karl Rove masterminds of the Bush
administration's tyrannical tendencies even went so far as to fire nine
U.S. Attorneys whose fidelity to the new legal-policy dispensation was in
doubt. 109 Cheney and Rover would go on to insist that the firings were
professional rather than political,llo despite critics assertions that it was
all political.
Regardless, the point to emphasize is that these were not mere
happenstance but institutionalized professional conduct within the legal
and justice system whereby many well-respected lawyers, judges,
congressional lawyer-politicians, legal policy advisers, law professors,
and legal think-tanks legitimized and cheered-on many of the Draconian
policies of the Bush administration. I I I Because those impugned policies
and convictions run deep in the culture, economy, and polity of our
civilized society of unquestioned and unqualified rule of law, the Obama
administration has simply reformulated but not abandoned or eradicated
many such legal abuses and misuses. Indeed, even in 2009 when
segments of the American public confronted the Obama administration
with vocal calls to formally investigate and censor the legalized excesses

See SANDS, supra note 106.
ld.
109 ld. Philippe Sands, himself Queen's Counsel and Professor of International Law at
The University College, London, has been particularly outraged that the fmgerprints of the
most senior lawyers in the Bush administration--our storied guardians of the rule of lawwere all over the design and implementation of the abusive interrogation policies and
practices. His dishonor roll call using the last names of the torture team of lawyers that made
the Bush administration believe it could circumvent international law, the Geneva
Conventions, and the U.S. Army's own Field Manual are: Addington, Bybee, Gonzales,
Haynes, and Yoo. ld.
110
ld.
III
ld.
107
108
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of the Bush administration,112 the Obama administration chose not to
investigate, prosecute, or censor. 113 As usual, the ideological justification
was a variation on letting sleeping dogs lie, public safety and national
security interests,114 which are the same interests that many courts have
also continued to invoke while overseeing procedurally questionable
trials. Even as a matter of degree rather than kind, it is thus a mistake to
think that it was only under Nazi Germany that criminal and
administrative prosecutions and proceedings were procedurally tainted or
otherwise compromised for whatever rationalizations.

iv. Not One Size Fits All Please
Moreover, the formulated ideals of professionalism omit or gloss over
the differing experiential and world-view realities of internal stratification
within the legal profession and amongst lawyers themselvesYs Some
lawyers who are highly ranked by their peers inhabit questionable morals
and conduct themselves unconscionably, often at the expense of, or while
exploiting, the poor and powerless under the guise of vague contractual
rights and obligations. Conversely, other lawyers, who are highly
principled, serve in modest-paying jobs, yet they attempt to solidify the
American legal system's eloquent promise of equality and fairness in the
everyday lives of the poor and powerless.
Some prosecutors, who as a rule serve without heed to political
ambitions, spend their entire legal careers trying to deprive some
members of the public of their civil liberties under the guise of pressing
the public interest in safety or security. Often defense attorneys with
little or no political capital go to great lengths to keep all citizens,
including criminally charged outlaws, out of prison in hopes of achieving
justice and fairness for the same public.
Other than a shared interest in the professional practice of law, which
is certainly important, as a practical matter, do all these lawyers in
various practice areas necessarily share the same ideals of
professionalism, no matter what? With respect, we doubt it. That is at
least debatable, especially as the ideals of professionalism necessarily
draw on a value system that presupposes interests, principles, and choices
112 See, e.g., text and attached files in Center for Constitutional Rights, The Spanish
Investigation into US.
Torture,
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/spanish-

investigation-us-torture (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
113
Id.
114

115

Id.
See, e.g., ANSELEM L. STRAUSS, PROFESSIONS, WORK AND CAREERS 10 (Transaction

Books 1975) (stating that the professions are not homogenous communities but loose
amalgamations of segments pursuing different objectives in different manners). Lawyers and
law practice are segmented both vertically or hierarchically between practice areas (e.g.,
corporate versus public interest/legal aid practice), and horizontally within particular niches of
the same practice areas (e.g., criminal prosecution versus criminal defense). Id.
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in terms of high-order issues and dilemmas of socio-Iegal and moralethical philosophy. 116
These substantive dilemmas and internal contradictions do not
suddenly disappear simply because we formulated an elegant list of
ideals, principles, and standards of professionalism. Without imputing
any untoward intentions, one could argue that the Ideals may in fact have
unwittingly privileged the interests of some legal practice groups, niches,
and proclivities (e.g., large firm corporate and insurance defense bar),
while simultaneously omitting or silencing the interests of others (e.g.,
solo and small firm plaintiff bar) in important respects. Based on similar
concerns, it could be said that the majestically elegant law prohibits both
the rich and the poor, upon penalty of imprisonment, to sleep under a
bridge, to beg for alms, or to steal bread to feed their hungry children.
Regardless, we will again note that the legal practice transactional
conflicts inherent to such a scenario of structural and philosophical
dilemmas and contradictions may arise in forms the Ideals could
mistakenly try to exhaust unsuccessfully with the language of courtesy,
civility, or decorum. With respect, while courtesy, civility, and decorum
are important professional qualities to be cultivated, they are not the only
considerations in our discourse of professionalism.

v. For Better And Not So Good
The remainder of the Ideals, which deal with itemized ideals of
professionalism, including: accountability and trustworthiness; a calling
to service; education, mentoring, and excellence; and fairness, civility,
and courtesy, do a reasonable and commendable job of covering the
standard expectations. ll7 The Ideals address fidelity, credibility, and
integrity to clients; the rules and the courts; punctuality, preparation,
competency, and decorum when dealing with the court, opposing counsel,
parties, and the public; honest and candid communication of nonconfidential matter; and the need to resist financial pressures that may
cloud one's professional judgment. The Ideals also exhort lawyers to go
about their jobs with the goal of equality and fairness by avoiding
wrongful discrimination based on "race, sex, gender, religion, national
origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status,
socioeconomic status, or political affiliation.,,118 The document expects
all lawyers to ensure that they are current in legal knowledge and with
changes in the law that may affect their clients' interests. 119 The
116
For example, when two equally valuable moral-ethical-legal principles collide, why
and how should one yield? Who gets to make that decision? What criteria is used? Whose
best interests should be served?
117
Ideals of Professionalism, supra note 6.
118 Id. at 2.
119 Id. at 4.
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document calls upon senior lawyers to mentor new lawyers willingly,
both by their own examples and by ensuring that the new lawyers learn
and apply the ideals of professionalism in their professional lives. 120 The
Ideals not only invite lawyers to recognize that the practice of law is a
calling to public service rather than only a business pursuit, but also
presents an expectation that lawyers accept responsibility for ensuring
that justice is available to all people regardless of financial means. 121
Perhaps as a reflection of the balance of current concerns, the Ideals
include copious language on the question of civility in all
communications, including electronic communications, which is certainly
current and in keeping with the times.
Overall, the snapshots that come across from the remainder of the
Ideals are all legitimate professionalism standards, principles,
expectations, concerns, and issues. The problem with the Ideals is not its
adherence to legitimate and long-standing professionalism standards and
issues. Rather, it is the Ideals' glaring omissions, value priorities, and
one-dimensional portraits that are of greatest concern. For example,
those lawyers committed to the progressive and anti-oppressive practice
of law certainly value and recognize fairness, civility, and courtesy. It is
simply not enough to exhibit courtesy or display insincere politeness if
the lawyer is presenting unreasonable claims, making unreasonable
requests, or otherwise taking unconscionable procedural positions
because of the extraordinary financial resources that allow him or her to
pursue a protracted litigation.
Frankly, as this discussion has practical, not simply theoretical,
implications, many lawyers are amazed that Maryland's professionalism
rules indulge rather appalling and abusive uses of the legal system. For
example, a lawyer defending a wealthy corporate client has a financial
incentive to draw out litigation by excessively filing baseless preliminary
motions. Such an attorney should resist the financial temptations and
adhere to the professionalism rules promulgated under the Ideals. In the
end, the Maryland legal community would benefit from a warts and all
discourse of professionalism consistent with the finer, albeit meSSler,
points of the reality of practicing law.
V.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, rather than proceeding as ifthere is a unitary conception of
law and legality, a homogenizing professional law practice experience, or
a disinterested set of core values animating professionalism itself, a more
complete discourse of legal professionalism should track the various
120
121

Id.
Id. at 4-5.
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approaches to, and contradictions within, law and professional law
practice groups. For the same reasons that our theory of human rights
would have been impoverished if the United Nations had stopped at its
storied first generation of rights, our understanding and action about legal
professionalism would be malnourished if we failed to forage beyond the
seminal ideals.
All lawyers want a profession that is glorious and effective, but there
is a need for a compelling internal debate about the legal profession
because we do not all necessarily always see or experience law the same
way. Maybe recalibrating the discourse of legal professionalism in ways
that openly and directly address the realities of the segmented working
world of lawyers and legal practice would ultimately serve the profession
and all practitioners better than a straightjacket, unitary, and essentialist
approach to twenty-first century legal professionalism. 122 To be both
realistic and comprehensive, lawyers could use having the standard or
conventional portrait of the Ideals of Professionalism for everyone
alongside annotated nuances, targeted provisions, and meaningful
formulations for the differential tracking of law practice and lawyers or
122
The twenty-first century is mentioned here because other than perhaps impending
demographic and generational shifts within the legal profession, there are factors largely
external to law, legality, legal practice, and the legal profession that are affecting all of that in
ways that might cause some anxieties or concerns about the professional standing, image, or
stability of lawyers and legal practice. We live in a post-industrial and postmodern
information society, economy, and culture. In addition to the disciplinary and occupational
practice boundary threats coming from immense trends toward transnational, interdisciplinary,
and multidisciplinary occupational and professional practice arrangements, the
contemporaneous changes in information and communication technology are not only
redefining law itself but also changing law practice and the operations of the profession.
Technology appears to be in the driver's seat some of the time in the courthouse, our offices,
and our dealings with the courts and opposing counsel. One cannot in good conscience be
into web surfing, e-mailing,e-trading,blogging,podcasting, YouTube,Craig's List, or
Facebook and yet not realize that some of the alternative, snappy, brisk, and casual subcultural trappings of such technologies will rub off on you, legal practice, and the legal
profession. The truth is that all of those things we fancy using also imperceptibly make some
of our work seem routine, deskilled, and even commonplace. Little wonder that paralegals,
legal agents, accountants, bookkeepers, real estate agents, and sundry two-year college
graduates working as temps or consultants on anything under the sun are finding it easier to
encroach on what is traditionally a lawyer's job. Some observers who probably wanted to
make a name by getting ahead of the times have even forecast the end oflawyers! My point,
then, is that we should probably be rethinking and reframing professionalism or fashioning a
new professionalism for our age, rather than harping back to the mostly mythical glory days
that some astute historians would call the way we never were when the whole truth emerges.
As Alan Cross, music and technology columnist for METRO newspaper has noted on the
topic of "The iPad Revolution," "[i]f there's one thing we've learned since the Regency TRI-the very first transistor radio in 1954-it's not the device itself, but it's what the device
allows us to do and the behaviors that result. Continue to expect many unintended and
unforeseen consequences." Alan Cross, Apple iPad is Poised to Change Music, METRO
CANADA, May 28, 2010, at 31.
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the dissimilar experience of law and the legal profession by subsets of
practItioners. This article submits that those are also legitimate but
omitted or silenced professionalism issues within the ambit of
accountability, public service, education, mentoring, excellence, fairness,
fidelity, civility, integrity, and trustworthiness without which mere
courtesy alone, for example, may seem quite insincere. Valuable and
thoughtful though the Ideals of Professionalism may be, further discourse
and more meaningful discussion on the limitations therein would be
beneficial.

